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ABSTRACT
Congress formed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 in part to improve
uniformity in the interpretation of patent law and to eliminate forum shopping. However, in 2002,
the Federal Circuit's ability to achieve that goal was reduced when the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Holmes Group v. Vornado, held that the Federal Circuit would not have jurisdiction in cases where
a federal patent law issue arises only in a responsive pleading. Many commentators have argued
that the Holmes decision runs afoul of the congressional mandate in forming the Federal Circuit.
With the hope of addressing this issue, the House Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property conducted hearings to determine whether Congress should override the
Supreme Court's Holmes decision and hence grant to the Federal Circuit plenary authority to hear
such patent appeals. This paper analyzes some of the recent criticism of the court, argues that the
Federal Circuit is achieving its goals, and therefore supports granting plenary patent appeal
authority to the Federal Circuit.

Copyright © 2005 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Meredith Martin Addy, Is the FederalCircuitReady to Accept
PlenaryA uthorityfor Paten t Appeals 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 583 (2005).

IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT PREPARED TO ACCEPT PLENARY AUTHORITY FOR
PATENT APPEALS?*
MEREDITH MARTIN ADDY**

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 to promote
uniformity and stability in the interpretation of patent law, to resolve the problems
produced by differing views of regional circuit courts on the value of patents, and to
eliminate the resultant forum shopping.1 The creation of the Federal Circuit "made
one immediate improvement: It stopped the appellate forum shopping that had
occurred when patent appeals were heard by each of the regional circuits." 2 Today,
twenty-three years later, the Federal Circuit has generally succeeded in its mandate
4
3
to promote uniformity although, some argue, not without a few bumps in the road.
Those bumps, however, have not been so high or so unexpected, and the Federal
Circuit has done, and is doing, a reasonable job of overcoming them.

I. BACKGROUND
Bear in mind that the Federal Circuit did not start with a clean slate for
precedent. The Court is required to follow the precedent of its predecessor courts,
and, for patents, such precedent comes from the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA').5 Prior to 1982, the CCPA heard appeals from the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") when the PTO denied the issuance of a patent. To
overrule a prior CCPA decision, the Federal Circuit must sit en banc. 6 Many early
Federal Circuit decisions wrestled with this requirement, and it took years for the

* Taken from the author's testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, during the March 17, 2005 Hearing
on Holmes Group, the Federal Circuit, and the State of Patent Appeals.
**The author thanks Cynthia A. Homan, Janet A. Pioli, Rashida Y.V. MacMurray and Thomas
J. Wrona, Ph.D. for all of their help in preparing this topic for the Congressional Hearings.
I See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-7, -reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 11, 12-17; see,
e.g., Chem. Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 333 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the FederalCourts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 543, 587 (2003) (citing Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
GeographicChoice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) (discussing forum shopping among
district courts in patent cases)).
3 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
EmpiricalAssessment of JudicialPerformance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1112-13 (2004); see also
Seamon, supra note 2, at 588, 594 n.329 ("Many commentators have praised the court for bringing
clarity and predictability to significant areas of patent law.").
4See, e.g., Seamon, supra note 2, at 588-89 nn.299, 300.
5 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
6 Id. at 1370 n.2.
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Federal Circuit to change CCPA precedent on some major doctrines.7 In addition,
while bound by CCPA precedent for existing issues, the Federal Circuit was in
uncharted territory for issues that did not fall within the jurisdiction of the CCPA,
such as most patent litigation issues; e.g., infringement, willful infringement and
inequitable conduct before the PTO. For these issues, the Federal Circuit had to
analyze a myriad of regional circuit law and determine the best course to take.
Because of the divergence in regional circuit law on patent doctrines, for the first
8
several years the Federal Circuit made broad-brush corrections to the law. Most
commentators will not deny that, while sweeping in nature, these seminal cases
made patent jurisprudence more consistent and predictable. 9
Today, after clearing away the cobwebs of prior jurisprudence and broadly
establishing important patent doctrines, the Federal Circuit is poised to better
accomplish its mandate by focusing on important sub-issues of patent jurisprudence.
For example, claim construction is a matter of law for the courts. 10 So, rather than
focus on whether elements of claim construction should go to the jury, as many
regional circuits believed, 11 the court can focus on the appropriate rubric for
12
determining the proper claim construction.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT IN HOLMES GROUP V. VORNADO CHANGED THE SCOPE OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S PATENT JURISDICTION

The Federal Circuit achieves its jurisdiction over patent cases pursuant to
35 U.S.C. §§ 1295 and 1338. Section 1338 sends patent claims to the federal district
courts by providing that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." 13 Section 1295
grants to the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from a final decision of a
district court if the "jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part on,
section 1338."14
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the "arising under" provision
of § 1338 in Holmes Group v. Vornado.1 5. The Court held, in accordance with the

7 See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overturning CCPA
precedent that permitted the PTO to apply a different standard than the courts when analyzing
claims drafted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 6).
8 See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (inequitable conduct); In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (obviousness);
Refac Intern., Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (frivolous appeal).
9 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, at ix (6th ed. 2003).
10 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), qffd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
11 See, e.g., Control Components, Inc. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that the meaning of a term in dispute is a factual issue to be determined by the jury); Roberts v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating "[o]nly a factual dispute as to
the meaning of a term of art used in the patent claim, the resolution of which required resort to
expert testimony, properly would have been submitted to the jury").
12 See generallyPhillipsv. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000) (emphasis added).
14 Id. § 1295.
15 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
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well-pleaded complaint rule, 16 that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction when
the complaint did not allege a cause of action arising under federal patent law, but
the answer contained a patent-law counterclaim. 17 Therefore, under Holmes, a
patent counterclaim filed in a responsive pleading could be appealed to the regional
circuit.18 In addition, a patent counterclaim filed in a responsive pleading in state
court might not be removed to federal district court but instead may be tried and
appealed through the state court system. 19 Many commentators have argued that
Holmes runs afoul of the Congressional mandate in forming the Federal Circuit, to
give the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. Commentators
also have argued that Holmes frustrates Congress's main purpose in forming the
Federal Circuit, to unify and stabilize patent law. 20 Others have argued to the
contrary-that Holmes is a good decision because it returns some authority to hear
patent cases to the regional circuits, and without that "percolation" of doctrines
through the circuits, the Federal Circuit runs the risk of making poor law and
21
becoming too powerful.
In response to these commentaries, the House Subcommittee on the Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property conducted hearings on March 17, 2005 to
determine whether Congress should enact a legislative override of the Supreme
Court's Holmes decision and hence grant to the Federal Circuit plenary authority to
hear patent appeals. It was in the context of this hearing that the Subcommittee
asked whether the Federal Circuit was achieving its mandate. This paper addresses
22
the Subcommittee's request by analyzing some of the recent criticism of the court.

III.

CRITICISMS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT Do NOT JUSTIFY LEAVING THE HOLMES
DECISION IN PLACE

As the Federal Circuit has matured, it appears to have found more critics.
However, for every complaint that the Federal Circuit is too pro-patentee, there is
23
one that asserts that burdens now being placed on the patentee are too harsh.
16FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
17Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834.
18 See, e.g., Telecom Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2004) (Eleventh

Circuit hearing a patent case with a gap of more than twenty years in its patent law precedent).
19 See, e.g., Green v Hendrickson Pubs., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ind. 2002) ("[W]e think
Holmes requires us to reject the federal authorities stating or implying that a state court may not
entertain a counterclaim under patent or copyright law.").
20See, e.g., Christian A. Fox, Note, On Your Mark, Get Set, Go!A New Race to the Courthouse
Sponsored by Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 2003 B.Y.U.L. REV. 331,
332 (2003).
21See, e.g., Ravi V. Sitwala, Note, In Defense ofHolmes v. Vornado:Addressingthe
UnwarrantedCriticism, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 452, 455 (2004).
22 This paper does not address the detailed analyses on the state of the various patent
doctrines, but focuses on more general criticisms.
23 See, e.g., Patricia A. Martrone, Supreme Court Limits Federal Circuit Jurisdiction over
Patent
Appeals,
http://www.ropesgray.com/newspubs/pubs.aspx?type=news&NewsJD= 1531 1605&SectionlD=7
(last
visited Mar. 16, 2005) ("The Federal Circuit has met a barrage of criticism in recent years, including
claims that it is pro-patent, anti-patent and prone to inconsistent results depending upon the panel
of judges who hear the case.").
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Constructive criticism as a whole benefits the court, and reflects the important role of
24
the Federal Circuit.

A. The Federal Creuit' Effect on the Quality of Patents
Until recently, most commentators believed that the Federal Circuit is propatent. 25 Many of these commentators argued that the Federal Circuit's pro-patent
stance hurts the quality of patents. 26 In particular, one commentator has stated that
the Federal Circuit's high affirmance rate on the validity of patents may hamper or
decrease patent quality. 27 This concern is a red herring. Realistic attempts to
increase patent quality should, in the very first instance, lie with the PTO.
Consider how few issued patents are ever litigated; much less make it through
trial and appeal. For example, 2,894 patent litigations were filed in 2003,28 and that
year the PTO issued 187,017 patents. 29 Thus, the ratio of the number of patent
litigations filed compared to the number of patents issued in 2003 is about 1.5%.3
About the same ratio holds for 2002.31 Because most patent lawsuits are settled, only
a very small percentage ever reaches trial; an even smaller number make it to the
appellate level. Therefore, the criticism that the Federal Circuit harms the quality of
patents through a pro-patent stance ignores the vast majority of patents that are
never reviewed by a court. If questionable patents exist, a more appropriate venue to
address quality is within the PTO itself, where any change should affect all the
patents that subsequently issue.
In recent years, Federal Circuit precedent has become less pro-patent. For
example, recent Federal Circuit case law on prosecution history estoppel sets rigid
limits on a patentee's ability to prevail on infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, the Federal
Circuit held that when a claim limitation is amended during prosecution for a reason
related to patentability, the patentee surrenders any equivalents for that

24 Se

Seamen,supra note 2,at 589.

See, e.g., Seamon, supra note 2, at 590 (citing ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1136 (5th ed. 2001); see also HARMON, supra note 9, at 1254 ("At the present time,
25

I feel comfortable in concluding that the patent enforcement pendulum is swinging toward a more
neutral position, where it really ought to be.").
26 See, e.g., Scott H. Segal, Fuelfor Thought: Clean Gasoline andDirty Patents,51 AM. U.L.
REV. 49, 65 (2001) (citing KEITH AOKI, THE STAKES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, IN THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 274 (David Kairys ed., 1998)).
27 See A. JAFFE & J. LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENT: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 126 (Princeton
University Press 2004) ("[T]he interaction between the stronger protection and a poorer patent office
has had a profound effect.").
28 See attached App. A.
29 United States Patent and Trademark Office, US. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 19632003, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (last visited July 30, 2005).
30 This number does not account for multiple litigations in 2003 over the same patent. Taking
multiple litigations on the same patent into consideration would further lower the percentage of
litigated versus issued patents in 2003.
31 In 2002, there were 2,675 patent litigations filed and 184,378 patents issued yielding the
ratio of 1.45%.
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limitation. 32 This "absolute bar" was a sharp departure from previous jurisprudence
in which Federal Circuit precedent applied a flexible bar when considering what
claims of equivalence were estopped by the prosecution history. 33 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision, and held that rather than an absolute
bar, the "patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not
surrender the particular equivalent in question."34 The Supreme Court apparently
felt that the Federal Circuit's decision in Festo was unduly harsh on the patentee.
In fact, commentators have noted this trend:
[F]ears that the court would develop tunnel vision and become unduly propatent have not materialized. While some judges on the court are viewed as
more hospitable to patents than others, one need only look at the court's
[doctrine of equivalents] decisions to conclude that the court is not propatent but is preoccupied with predictability and the notice function of
35
patents. And the court has had nothing resembling tunnel vision.
Research conducted by Professors John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley also supports
this proposition: "[Tihe votes of Federal Circuit judges during this period defied easy
description. Judges do not fit easily into 'pro-patent' or 'anti-patent' categories, or
36
into 'affirmers' and 'reversers.' We think this is a good thing for the court system."

1. The Standardfor Analyzing Patent Validity
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") also has criticized the arguably propatent stance of the Federal Circuit. 37 In the second recommendation of its October
2003 report, entitled: To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy, the FTC suggested legislation "to Specify that
Challenges to the Validity of a Patent Are To Be Determined Based on a
'Preponderance of the Evidence' standard rather than the current, well-established
38
and higher "clear and convincing" standard.
However, the FTC bases its recommendation entirely on the presumed
shortcomings of the PTO rather than on any fault of the Federal Circuit. 3 9 According
to the FTC, the PTO (1) favors issuing patents, (2) has insufficient resources and (3)
grants patents based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 40 Based on its
32 234

F.3d 558, 591 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).

33See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see

also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
34 Festo, 535 U.S. at 740.
35
Donald R. Dunner, Jefferson Medalist 2004 Address
(June 4, 2004),
http://ipmall.info/hosted resources/jefferson medalists_2004_address.asp (last visited July 31, 2005).
3 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity
Cases, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV. 745, 746 (2000).
37 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation." The ProperBalance of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, at 8 (2003) [hereinafter FTC Report],
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
38

d

39 See id. Executive Summary, at 1-7.
40 Id. Executive Summary, at 8-11.

[4:583 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property

perception of PTO shortcomings, the FTC would lower the Federal Circuit's legal
standard for assessing the validity of an issued patent.
Indeed, the FTC's analysis puts the proverbial "cart before the horse." If the
problem lies with the PTO, then it should be fixed at the PTO level, rather than
downstream at the Federal Circuit. If the problem affects 100% of issued patents,
then so should the solution. Remember, only a very small percentage of issued
patents are ever litigated and appealed to the Federal Circuit. As such, changing the
litigation standard for analyzing validity would affect only those patents which
happen to be litigated. The vast majority of patents still would issue from a PTO
that has the above-perceived shortcomings.
Additionally, lowering the court's standard for assessing validity would inject
further uncertainty into patent jurisprudence.
A preponderance -of-the -evidence
standard, which requires sufficient proof that it is more likely than not that a patent
is not valid, provides less stability and certainty in patent law. 41 Neither the
patentee nor the public would be able to rely on the grant of a patent as public notice
of what it covered.
As explained in the American Intellectual Property Law Association's ("AIPLA")
response to the FTC's analysis, "[lit appears that the FTC has misunderstood the
scope and motive of the 'clear and convincing evidence standard."' 42 According to the
43
AIPLA, "this misunderstanding is fostered by a lack of precision in many decisions."
Therefore, any remedy to Federal Circuit precedent should be accomplished through
"clarifications by judicial interpretation, not legislation." 44
For example, under current precedent, a patent will be held invalid if clear and
convincing evidence shows that the invention would have been obvious to one skilled
in the art at the time the invention was made. 45 As obviousness is a question of law
with underlying factual determinations, 46 proper obviousness analysis requires
that it is the underlying faets that must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, i.e., what is the content of the prior art and the level of skill in the
art. That does not apply, and should not apply to the legal conclusion of
invalidity, e.g., obviousness. It is only those predicate facts, not their
persuasive force, that must be clearly and convincingly established.
Clarification of those basic principles, and the correct ambit of the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard should, we believe, be addressed
by the courts, not Congress. When correctly applied as described above, the
41 See generallyMarkD. Janis, Ideas into Action.*Implementing Reform of the PatentSystem:
ReformingPatentValidity Litigation:The 'DubiousPreponderance",19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923

(2004).
42 American Intellectual Property Law Association, AIPLA Response to the October 2003

Federal Trade Commission Report: "To Promote Innovation: The ProperBalance of Competition
and Patent Law and Poliey," at 6 (2004), http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/
Issues andAdvocacy/Comments2/Patent and TrademarkOffice/2004/ResponseToFTC.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter AIPLA Response].
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (1998).
46 AIPLA Response, supranote 42, at 6.
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standard is appropriate and will not make patent challenges unduly
4
difficult or unfairly tilt the playing field. '
Therefore, consistent application by the Federal Circuit of the clear and convincing
standard, only on the proof of facts and not on their persuasive force, would help
address the FTC's concerns. 48 In addition, reform at the PTO also would help
address concerns about the issuance of questionable patents.

2. Federal Circuit Tests for DeterminingIf a PatentIs Obvious
The FTC criticizes the Federal Circuit's application of the obviousness test
because the subsidiary 'commercial success test' and 'the suggestion test' ... require
more thoughtful application to weed out obvious patents." 49 As briefly stated above,
a patent should not be issued, and if issued may be held invalid, if the "subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 50 The
nonobvious test asks "whether an invention is a big enough technical advance to
51
merit the award of a patent."
Obviousness is a question of law and like all legal conclusions it is reached
after answers to a series of potential fact questions have been found-and it
is reached in the light of those answers. In the ordinary patent case, the
trier of fact must answer the Graham inquiries relating to (1) the scope and
content of the prior art, (2) the differences between the art and the claims at
issue, (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (4) whatever objective
52
evidence may be present.
The commercial success test is part of the fourth inquiry from the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Graham v. John Deere Co., 53 which concerns available objective
evidence. Federal Circuit precedent requires "that there is commercial success, and
that the thing that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed
in the patent." 54 The "suggestion test" (or "motivation to combine") is part of the
second Graham inquiry, the differences between the prior art and the claims.
Federal Circuit precedent requires that "some objective teaching in the prior art or
that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead the

47 Id. at

7.

48Id. at 16.
49 FTC Report, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 11. The suggestion test is also referred

to as "motivation to combine."
5035 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).

51ROBERT

PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:

CASES AND MATERIALS 479 (2d ed.

1997).
52 HARMON, supra note 9, at 155-56 (internal citations omitted); see also Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
53 383 U.S. 1.
54 Id. at 18.
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individual to combine the teachings of the prior art"55 and arrive at the claimed
56
invention.

a. Commercial Sueeess
The FTC posits that the Federal Circuit places an undue reliance on the
"commercial success test" of an invention and fails to appreciate that "factors other
than the invention may have caused the success." 5 7 The FTC also asserts that the
commercial success test should be applied on a case-by-case basis, and a higher
58
burden should be placed on the patentee to show commercial success.
The FTC's analysis isflawed in three respects. First, not every obviousness
analysis involves a determination of commercial success. While commercial success
must be considered before finding an invention obvious, if the defendant does not
prove a prima facie case of obviousness, the court is not required to rule on the
59
commercial success of an invention.
Second, the test requires showing a nexus between the claimed invention and
the success.6 0 However, a patentee does not have to prove that the commercial
success of the patented invention is not due to factors other than the patented
invention. A requirement to prove this negative would be unfairly burdensome and
61
contrary to the ordinary rules of evidence.
Third, the Federal Circuit already analyzes commercial success on a case-by2
case basis as set forth in Demaeo Corp. v. F. Von LangsdorffLicensingLtd.6

b. The Suggestion Test-orMotivation to Combine
The "suggestion test" asks if the prior art would have suggested the claimed
invention to one of ordinary skill in the art.63 The FTC criticizes Federal Circuit
precedent but comments that recent articulations of the suggestion test seem to
signal greater appreciation of the requirement for "concrete suggestions" in the prior
art to combine or modify references beyond those needed by a person with ordinary
skill in the art. 64 The AIPLA notes that "[siuggestion or motivation for combination
or modification must be clearly present and based on concrete evidence in the prior
art," as the Federal Circuit's articulation of the test consistently recognizes. 65 The
5 In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
,56
Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
57FTC Report, supranote 37, Executive Summary, at 11.
5 Icd
59 See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., 391 F.3d 1365, 1373 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
60 See, e.g., Demaeo, 851 F.2d at 1392.
61Id.
6'2
Id. (The patentee must demonstrate a "legally and factually sufficient connection between
the proven success and the patented invention.").
6 See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
64See FTC Report, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 12; AIPLA Response, supra note 42,
at 22.
6 AIPLA Response, supranote 42, at 22.
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AIPLA also notes that "[to the extent this may be a problem, it appears to be selfcorrecting through the traditional evolution of case law as applied in specific fact
situations." 66 Hence, the FTC's criticisms of the Federal Circuit's obviousness test do
not reflect an understanding of the purpose of the various Graham inquiries or how
they are applied in practice. Improvements to the obviousness test are best made
through the evolution of case law.

B. The Federal CircuitsAlleged Expansion of the Scope ofPatentableSubject
Matter
Section 101 of the Patent Act states that "[wihoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent."67 The U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted this statute broadly to hold that even man-made, living organisms
and computer software constitute patentable subject matter. 68 Indeed, in Diamond v.
Diehr, the Supreme Court stated that patentable subject matter includes "anything
under the sun made by man."69 The FTC takes issue with Federal Circuit precedent
holding business methods and software patentable, asserting that such patents may
not be necessary to spur invention. 70 However, the language of § 101 and the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr71 both support the continued
acceptance of business methods and software as patentable subject matter despite
the economic reservations of the FTC.

C. Economic Theory
The FTC complains that the "Federal Circuit ... may also benefit from much
greater consideration and incorporation of economic insights in their [sic]
decisionmaking." 72 The FTC bases its criticism on its experience with antitrust
law. 73 However, the AIPLA responds that antitrust law relies heavily on "rules of
reason," and per se rules generally are disfavored. 74 Patent law, on the other hand,
75
largely is based on per se rules.
The criteria for utility, novelty, and disclosure are each per se
standards and no factors are evaluated for their reasonableness ...
66Id.

U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See FTC Report, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 14; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty,

(3735
(3

477 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that man-made living organisms are patentable);
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that computer software is patentable).
( Diehz , 450 U.S. at 182.
70 See FTC Report, supra note 37, Executive Summary, at 14-15.

Diamond v. Diehr,

71 450 U.S. at 182.

72 FTC Report, supranote 37, Executive Summary, at 17.

73 Id. ch. 6.I.A., at 1 ("Antitrust Law and Policy Can and Should Take Patent Policy Into
Account to Promote Consumer Welfare").
74 AIPLA Response, supranote 42, at 40-41.
75 Id. at 41.
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[Aipplying a comparable level of flexibility in the patent context would
simply introduce uncertainty and unpredictability into a system that is
striving for greater certainty and predictability. . . . [Injecting economic
theory into the interpretation and application of clearly defined statutory
criteria, will simply result in greater uncertainty.... [The] AIPLA believes
that Congress, not the PTO or the courts, is the proper authority to consider
economic theory and competition policy-oriented principles [relating to
patent law].76
Even considering these limitations on the application of economic theory to
patent law, the Federal Circuit likely would benefit from digesting relevant economic
theory and analyzing it if presented in the record. However, the Federal Circuit
cannot be expected to research and locate such theory. If applicable economic theory
exists, litigants should bring it to the attention of the court.

D. PanelDependeneies and Supreme CourtReview
Federal Circuit Judges, without exception, are highly interested in patent
jurisprudence whether or not they arrived on the bench from a patent background.
For any particular case, they know the materials on appeal, are very well prepared
for oral argument, and have an in-depth knowledge and respect for the precedent
that they both create and apply. Federal Circuit judges recognize and respect their
unique position as virtually the sole arbiters of patent jurisprudence, along with their
other specialized jurisdictions; they recognize the need for uniform application of
patent law and work hard towards that end.
As a result of the Federal Circuit's work, patent jurisprudence progresses at
"light-speed" when compared to areas of law left to percolate through the regional
circuits. In addition, because most patent appellate decisions are handed down by
the Federal Circuit, court watchers are able to detect "panel inconsistencies" quickly.
77
These panel inconsistencies subject the Federal Circuit to considerable criticism.
However, the subjects upon which panel inconsistencies exist are relatively minor in
comparison to the situation before creation of the Federal Circuit. In addition,
contrary to most criticism, "some would see disagreement among panels of the
Federal Circuit as reflecting an internal 'percolation' of views that may be a good
78
substitute for percolation among the circuits."
The Federal Circuit is not unaware of these apparent panel inconsistencies, and
the Judges' differing perspectives form the basis for lively debate on the court
through internal memoranda, additional opinions, and oral argument.
Many
inconsistencies in decisions do result in en banc hearings and decisions by the

76 Id.
77 See Seamon, supra note 2, at 589 n.299 (citing Paul R. Michel, The Court ofAppeals for the
Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (1999);
Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: InereasingPredietabibtyin Federal Circuit Jurisprudence
for the New Century,43 AM U. L. REV. 1231, 1232-33 (1994)).
78 Seamon,

supra note 2, at 589.
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court.7 9 But a split in authority on an issue cannot be resolved overnight. The court
uses precedent to (1) find a suitable case that presents the issue appropriately,
(2) successfully accomplish the internal procedure to elevate the case to en banc
status,8 0 (3) accept briefing from the parties and interested amici,81 (4) conduct oral
argument, and 5) render an en banc decision.8 2 Recently, the Federal Circuit has
increased the number of patent cases that it hears en banc.
One measure of the court's success may be the extent "to which its decisions
have been reviewed and reversed or vacated by the Supreme Court."8 3 Since its
inception through July 8, 2002, the Federal Circuit had a certiorari "grant rate" of
about 2.8% over the breadth of its jurisdiction.8 4 This grant rate is below the average
for all other courts from 1982 through 2000.85 Also, since its inception through July 8,
2002, the Supreme Court has affirmed Federal Circuit decisions in twelve of fortytwo cases in which an opinion was issued, yielding an affirmance rate of 28.6%,
which also is better than other courts' average in the Supreme Court.8 6 Of course,
these statistics also may represent a Supreme Court that is relatively disinterested
in patent jurisprudence; alternately, the numbers may be low for the Federal Circuit
because of the large number of criminal appeals from regional circuits and state
courts.

87

E. ProvidingPlenaryAuthority to the FederalCircuit to HearAll PatentAppeals
The Supreme Court's Holmes decision8 8 changed the jurisdictional basis for
pendant patent issues in non-patent cases by holding that the Federal Circuit cannot
assert jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not state a patent law

79 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), revd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketusu Kimsoko Kogyo Kabushiki, 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kimsoko Kogyo Kabushiki, 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (en bane); Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Servs. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en bane); Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane).
80 A majority of participating, active judges must vote in favor of taking the case en bane. See
FED. R. APP. P. 35, http://www.fedeir.gov/pdf/cafc2004.pdf (as amended for the Federal Circuit).
81 A majority of participating, active judges must vote in favor of taking the case en banc. See
FED. R. APP. P. 35(g), http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/cafc2004.pdf (as amended for the Federal Circuit).
82 See FED. R. APP. P. 35, http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/cafc2004.pdf (as amended for the Federal
Circuit).
83 Seamon, supra note 2, at 592 n.325.
84 Jd
85 See id. at 593 n.327; The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539,
546, tbl.JJ(B) (2001); The Supreme Court in the Nineties: A StatisticalRetrospective, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 390, 402, tbl.I (2000); The Supreme Court in the Eighties: A StatisticalRetrospective, 104
HARv. L. REV. 367, tbl.J (1990).
2
8 See Seamon, supra note 2, at 593-94 and nn.296, 328 ("reporting a
1.3% [average]
affirmance rate from the 1982 Term through the 2000 Term").
87 The Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over criminal cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(2000); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b), http://www.fedeir.gov/pdf/cafc2004.pdf (as amended for the Federal
Circuit, all mention of appeal from criminal cases are stricken).
88 Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
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issue, even though a responsive pleading does. 89 After Holmes, responsive patent
pleadings do not, on their own, trigger Federal Circuit jurisdiction.
Many
commentators believed that this change would greatly affect the fabric of patent
practice and that it would undermine Congressional intent to promote uniformity in
the interpretation of patent law. 90 A possibility exists that district courts will choose
to follow their regional circuit patent precedent, despite it being twenty-three years
old, rather than Federal Circuit precedent, and state courts could now hear patent
cases filed as counterclaims to non-patent suits arguably for the first time. 91 This
could lead to a lack of uniformity in patent law and return patent lawyers to the days
of rampant forum shopping prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. 92 While it
appears that these strange occurrences are possible, in the three years since the
Holmes decision, they have not been as frequent as many expected.93 Nevertheless, a
legislative solution, to grant plenary rights to the Federal Circuit for patent
appeals, 94 would remove the specter of non-Federal Circuit patent jurisprudence,
diminish forum shopping, and simplify matters for litigants.
Critics argue that expanding the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to include all
patent jurisdiction would improperly confer too much power on the court. For
example, granting such broad jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit allegedly will
increase its already important role in patent-antitrust law. While some have said
that antitrust jurisprudence is best left percolating through the regional circuits,
when it is interwoven with patent law, 95 it should be decided by the Federal Circuit
to ensure uniformity and consistency. 96 The FTC even noted that the Federal Circuit
was expected to have a role in fashioning antitrust law. 97 Also, the antitrust-patent
overlap is already distinct from other areas of antitrust law, and a legislative
amendment to ensure all patent claims go to the Federal Circuit would have little or
no affect on these other areas of antitrust law. When deciding antitrust claims that
are not unique to patent law, the Federal Circuit already applies the appropriate
98
regional circuit law.

89 Id.at 834 n.4.
90 See, e.g., Status Report on Developments Relating to the Jurisdiction of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Holmes Group Task Force Intellectual Property Committee
Section of Antitrust Law American Bar Association, at 13 n.56 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Report].
91Id. at 8; see also Telecom Tech. Servs. v. Rolm, Co., 388 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2004) ( Eleventh
Circuit hearing a patent case with a gap of more than twenty years in its patent law precedent);
Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, 770 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind.2002) ("[W]e think Holmes requires us
to reject the federal authorities stating or implying that a state court may not entertain a
counterclaim under patent or copyright law.").
92 ABA Report, supra note 90, at 13.
93 See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 90, at 21-22; c.f, Unanimous Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee to Study Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 12 FED. CIR.B.J.
687, 715 (2004) [hereinafter FCBA Report].
94 See FCBA Report, supra note 93, at 719.
9'See ABA Report, supra note 90, at 78.
96 See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc on choice of law).
97FTC Report, supranote 37, at 17 (Chapter 6).
98 See, e.g., Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068.
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IV. CONCLUSION

In the past twenty-three years, the Federal Circuit generally has met its
mandate of providing more uniformity and stability to patent law than previously
existed. While the first part of its existence has been spent stabilizing various
doctrines, today the Federal Circuit has begun to address sub-issues within larger
doctrines. In addition, the Federal Circuit has developed a robust body of patentantitrust law and stands in the best position to further address that precedent and
confirm that it is applied uniformly. Therefore, the Federal Circuit is prepared to
accept this additional jurisdiction, if provided by a legislative answer to Holmes, and
apply it pursuant to the appropriate precedential requirements.
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APPENDIX A.

LexisNexis ® CourtLink ®
Nature of Suit Strategic Profile
Property Rights - Patent (830)
1/1/1995 - 3/14/2005
23849 Case(s)
All Courts
Total Cases Filed - Between 1/1/1995 and 3/14/2005, Property Rights - Patent (830).
Cases were filed with the following distribution based on date filed. These cases are
restricted to those filed in All Courts.
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